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Rogers: Constitutional Law - A Forum by Any Other Name ... Would Be Just

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - A Forum by Any Other Name... Would
Be Just as Confusing: The Tenth Circuit Dismisses Intent from the Public Forum. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir. 2002).
INTRODUCTION

On December 1, 1998, representatives of the Salt Lake City Corporation (hereinafter the "City") and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints (hereinafter "LDS Church") held a joint news conference announcing
the proposed development of an "open-space pedestrian plaza" in downtown
Salt Lake City.' The new plaza would be built upon a section of Main Street
between North and South Temple.2 It was announced that the plaza would
form an attractive pedestrian thoroughfare enhancing the beauty of downtown Salt Lake City.3

Following the announcement, the LDS Church filed a petition with
the City for street closure and submitted plans for a pedestrian easement to
the City Planning Commission The Planning Commission recommended
that the City Council approve the sale of the property on the condition that
the City retain a perpetual pedestrian easement "so as to maintain, encourage, and invite public use" and "that there be no restrictions on the use of
this space that are more restrictive than is currently permitted at a public
park."5 The City Council only adopted some of the Planning Commission's
suggested conditions on April 13, 1999.6 The City Council retained the
Planning Commission's recommendation that the City retain a public use
easement as a condition of the sale. 7 However, the Council omitted the suggested condition requiring that the plaza be regulated no more strictly than a
public park.'
The sale was enacted through the recording of a Special Warranty
Deed and Reservation of Easement conveying the Main Street surface property to the LDS Church.9 The reservation of easement provided for "pedestrian access and passage only" and stipulated that the church would not erect
any perimeter fences or gates adjacent to city rights of way."0 The reserva1. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 2002).
2.
Id. at 1118.
3.
Rebecca Walsh, New Plaza Proposed On Main; Downtown street would be sold to
LDS Church, closed; Plaza Proposedon Street In Downtown S.L., S.L. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1998, at
Al.
4.
First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1118.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
Id.
8.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. The full text of the reservation of easement read:
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tion was followed by express language stating the parties' intent that the
easement would not create a public forum of any sort." This language was
accompanied by an extensive list of activities the LDS Church would be
allowed to restrict on the property. 2 Among the activities subject to restriction were assembling, demonstrating, picketing, use of loudspeakers or
signs, distribution of literature, and otherwise disturbing the peace. 3
Following the sale, at its own expense, the LDS Church reconstructed the former street into a pedestrian plaza, forming an attractive extension of the Church's downtown campus.' 4 Several parties, constituting
the plaintiffs in this case, soon challenged the restrictions contained in the
easement. 5 Challenge was filed with the United States District Court for the
District of Utah. 6 The plaintiffs were the First Unitarian Church of Salt

Grantor reserves an easement over and across the surface of the Property
for pedestrian access and passage only... Grantee shall not erect any perimeter fences or gates on the property along the North Temple or South
Temple rights of way .... Grantor may allow the general public to use
this easement for pedestrian access and passage only, but all use of this
easement shall be subject to the conditions, limitations and restrictions
described herein below.
Id.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 1118-19.
Id. The full text of the restrictions read as follows:
Nothing in the reservation or use of this easement shall be deemed to create or constitute a public forum, limited or otherwise, on the Property.
Nothing in this easement is intended to permit any of the following enumerated or similar activities on the Property: loitering, assembling, partying, demonstrating, picketing, distributing literature, soliciting, begging,
littering, consuming alcoholic beverages or using tobacco products, sunbathing, carrying firearms (except for police personnel), erecting signs or
displays, using loudspeakers or other devices to project music, sound or
spoken messages, engaging in any illegal, offensive, indecent, obscene,
vulgar, lewd or disorderly speech, dress or conduct, or otherwise disturbing the peace. Grantee shall have the right to deny access to the Property
to persons who are disorderly or intoxicated or engaging in any of the activities identified above. The provisions of this section are intended to
apply only to Grantor and other users of the easement and are not intended to limit or restrict Grantee's use of the Property as owner thereof,
including, without limitation, the distribution of literature, the erection of
signs and displays by Grantee, and the projection of music and spoken
messages by Grantee.

Id.
14.
Id. at 1119.
15.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (D. Utah
2001).
16.
Id. at 1155.
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Lake City, Utahns for Fairness, the Utah National Organization for Women,
and one individual, Craig Axford."7
The plaintiffs named the Salt Lake City Corporation as the defendant." The Corporation of the Presiding Bishopric of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints was permitted to intervene as defendant.' 9 All
parties promptly filed for summary judgment on all claims.2" The United
States District Court for the District of Utah, Judge Ted Stewart presiding,
granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs, in favor of the City and the
LDS Church.2
Judge Stewart noted that the facts showed that the plaza property
had been so altered that any traditional public forum that had existed prior to
the property's sale had terminated with the sale.22 He then ruled that the
property constituted a "nonpublic forum. ' 23 Applying the less stringent constitutional restrictions that apply to property not protected under the First
Amendment, he easily concluded that the City's restrictions of the easement
were permissible.24 After quickly dismissing the plaintiffs' other claims,
Judge Stewart granted summary judgment for the defendants.25
Following the District Court ruling, the plaintiffs appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.26 The Court of Appeals first noted that the District Court had erred by analyzing the surrounding property instead of the easement itself, and then held that the easement
was still a traditional public forum.2 7 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit Court
reversed the District Court decision.28
Ever since the Supreme Court's 1983 landmark decision in Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, the First
17.
Id. at 1159. Craig Axford is a resident of Salt Lake City and a member of the Unitarian Church. ACLU Utah, First Unitarian v. Salt Lake City Corporation, available at
http://www.acluutah.org/mscomplaint.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). He testified in opposition to the sale at public hearings and claims that although he would have visited and used the
plaza, he will now take pains to avoid using the easement to avoid being confronted with
governmentally-endorsed religious messages. Id.
18.
First Unitarian,146 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
19.
Id. The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop is the arm of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints that oversees all Church finances and expenditures. Peggy Fletcher
Stack, S.L. Man Is LDS PresidingBishop, S.L. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1995, at DI.
20.
First Unitarian,146 F. Supp. 2d at 1158-59, 1161.
21.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2002).
22.
First Unitarian,146 F. Supp. 2d at 1158-59, 1171.
23.
Id. at 1172.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.at 1180.
26.
First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1117.
27.
Id.at 1128.
28.
Id. at 1133-34.
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Amendment "forum analysis" used in First Unitarian has become the judicial tool of choice in analyzing public speech rights on government-owned
property.29 However, forum analysis has been widely criticized in both judicial and academic circles, not only for its hopelessly confusing attendant
case law, but for its failure to adequately address the First Amendment issues inherent in government property.30 This case note will first explore the
convoluted history of "forum analysis" in Supreme Court case law. Next, it
will detail the ruling of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in First Unitarian. Finally, this note will provide an analysis of the court's application of
the public forum framework in First Unitarian. The analysis will also show
that the Tenth Circuit opinion applies the public forum framework in a way
that is both more consistent with the history of public forum jurisprudence,
and more responsive to the First Amendment issues inherent in government
property than recent Supreme Court rulings.
BACKGROUND

Government as a Private Property Owner
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."'"
While freedom of speech in the United States is as old as the Bill of
Rights, freedom to conduct that speech on government property is actually a
relatively recent development. For much of American history, United States
Supreme Court opinion refused to recognize any public speech rights on

29.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-47 (1983). See
also Stephen K. Schutte, InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: The
Public Forum Doctrine Falls to Government Intent Standard, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
563 (1993).
30.
For examples of judicial criticism of the public forum doctrine, see Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (Breyer, J., concurring); Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 627, 694 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
dissenting). For examples
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
of scholarly criticism, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987 (2d ed.
1988); Schutte, supra note 29, at 568; David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine,
78 IOWA L. REv. 143, 145, 202 (1992); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 949, 980 (1991); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and
Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715
(1987); Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment
Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 110, 120 (1986); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment
Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1223-24 (1984).
31.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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government property. a2 This is typified in the case of Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.3 In Davis, the Court upheld a Boston ordinance
prohibiting "any public address" on publicly owned property without a permit from the mayor. The Court based its decision on the premise that the
government had a right to control the use of its own property. a5
This view of speech activity on government property saw its first reversals in 1939. In Hague v. CIO, the Court struck down a city ordinance
quite similar to the ordinance in Davis.36 The ordinance prohibited all public
meetings in the streets and other public places without a permit from the
city.37 In dicta that would be used in countless later cases, Justice Roberts
stated,
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.3"
In Schneider v. State ofNew Jersey, the Court struck down a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on public property in spite of
the city's arguments that the ordinance was necessary to prevent litter and
maintain the appearance of its streets. 39 The Court wrote, "We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a
public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it." 40 In its
ruling in Schneider, not only had the Court struck down a government attempt to regulate its own property, but the Court had done so despite govERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1083 (2d ed.
32.
2002).
33.
Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
34.
Id. at 43.
35.
Id. at 47. Justice White summed up the Court's view of the plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to the Boston City ordinance writing, "For the legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it
in his house." Id.
36.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 501 (1939). In Hague, the ordinance had been implemented to deny a permit to assemble to a labor organization on the grounds that it was a
Communist group. Id. Members found distributing literature in the streets were forcibly
compelled to desist by the police and many members of the organization has been arrested
and deported from the city. Id. at 504.
37.
Id. at 501.
38.
Id. at 515.
Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 156 (1939).
39.
40.
Id. at 162.
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ernment assertions that such a requirement would interfere with legitimate
state interests. 4' Furthermore, the Court even rejected the argument that
such speech activities could be conducted elsewhere.42
In spite of such advances in public speech, the assumption of the
United States government as a private property holder still clung to the
Court in later cases. In Adderley v. Florida for example, the Court upheld
the convictions of several students who were arrested for demonstrating
against racial segregation while on jailhouse grounds.43 The Court explained
that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."
The Court then declared that as long as the government did not
discriminate on the basis of the content of the students' speech, its restrictions would be found permissible.4 5 After Adderley, the United States government was still a private property holder. However, as subsequent Supreme Court case law demonstrates, fully articulating the relationship between the First Amendment and public property would prove a difficult task.
Making Government PropertyFit the FirstAmendment
Justice Robert's famous "time out of mind" statement in Hague established a presumptive right to use sidewalks for speech activities.' Yet,
by painting free speech rights on public property as a sort of public speech
easement, Hague preserved the idea that the United States government has
the same basic right to exclude people and views that a private property
owner does.47 This idea of private property ownership complicated the application of First Amendment principles to government property in later
cases, and eventually resulted in the categorical approach adopted in Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, which remains in force today.48 However, Perry was preceded by a period of Court
experimentation during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, where it was
not entirely certain that Hague's idea of the public forum would survive at
all.49 Two cases are representative of the attempt to incorporate the ideals of
the civil rights movement into the Court's analysis of free speech on public
41.
Id. In rejecting the city's argument, the Court noted that there were other ways for the
city to prevent littering without running afoul of the Constitution. Id.
42.
Id. at 163. The Court stated, "[T]he streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place." Id.
43.
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 40 (1966).
44.
Id. at 47.
45.
Id. at 48.
46.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); CHBMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1085.
47.
Dienes, supra note 30, at 112.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. at 112-14. See also, Post, supra note 30, at 1729-30.
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property. These cases are Police Dept. v. Mosley and Grayned v. City of
Rockford. °
Mosley dealt with the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing or demonstrating on a public way, near a school building,
while school was in session.' However, the ordinance exempted "peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute."52
The Court chose to frame the issues in light of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stating, "There is an 'equality of status
in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of view an equal
opportunity to be heard."53 The Court also made direct reference to the idea
of the public forum noting that "[s]elective exclusions from a public forum
may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to
content alone."54 Even while introducing Equal Protection analysis however, the Court was unable to escape from the private ownership framework
of the public forum established in Hague and Adderley 5
What emerges from Mosley, is a two-track analysis of speech rights
on public property.56 The crucial distinction is whether or not the government regulation is directed at the content of the speech. If the government
legislates on the basis of the content of the speech, it must either show that
the speech belongs to an unprotected category such as obscenity, or it must
57
show that the law is necessary for a compelling government interest.
However, if the regulation is content-neutral, it will be subject to a lesser
burden of showing that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a significant
or substantial government interest and that alternative means of communication are available.5
In Grayned,the Supreme Court appeared ready to entirely reject the
Davis idea of government as a private property holder." Here, the Court
upheld a municipal ordinance that prohibited disturbing school classes, by
noise or diversion, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any school
building.' While upholding the ordinance, the Court took the opportunity to
50.
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
51.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 96 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).
54.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
55.
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 n.9 (1983).
56.
Schutte, supra note 29, at 113-14.
57.
Id.at 114.
58.
Id.
59.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
60.
Id. at 107-08.
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discuss speech rights on public property. The Court began with what
seemed like a clear refutation of the Davis assumption: "The right to use a
public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons." 6 1 Whereas Davis created a presumption of government license to
regulate its own property however it wished, Grayned now seemed to shift
the burden of justifying the regulation onto the government.6 2
The Court continued by noting that while the government cannot
make content-based restrictions, it may make reasonable "time, place and
manner" regulations that are necessary to further a significant government
interest. 63 However, the Court then declared that in determining the reasonableness of such regulations "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time." In Davis, the Court had classified public property without any real reference to the First Amendment.6 5 However, in
Grayned, the Court now proposed a new, unified First Amendment test that
would be applied to all public property.'
What is significant about both Mosley and Grayned is that characterization of the property in question as a public forum is not crucial to the
outcome, and there is at least some discussion of the First Amendment issues
at stake.6 7 However, this approach was abandoned by the Court a few years
later in Greer v. Spock, which reinstated classification of government property as the determinative factor.68 In Greer, the Court upheld a regulation
prohibiting "demonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, [and] political speeches" on a military base even though the regulation also included
some parts of the base to which civilians were allowed free access.6 9
In upholding the regulation, the Court not only invoked public forum classification as a threshold issue, it also included a new focus on
whether the property in question had a tradition of being open to the public
for First Amendment activities.70 The result of Greer was to shift Court at61.
Id. at 115.
62.
Post, supra note 30, at 1729-30.
63.
Grayned,408 U.S. at 115-16.
64. Id. at 116.
65.
Post, supranote 30, at 1731.
66.
Id. See also, Grayned,408 U.S. at 116-17.
67.
Grayned,408 U.S. at 115.
68.
Post, supra note 30, at 1739.
69.
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976). The Court found that the regulation had
been applied in a acceptably neutral fashion and was not unreasonable given the military's
historical mandate to provide for the national defense. Id. at 838-39. While admitting that the
regulation might possibly be applied irrationally or arbitrarily, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to submit any material proving such a claim. Id. at 840.
70.
Citing Justice Roberts' famous Hague dicta, the Court defined a public forum as a
place that has traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and communication of
thoughts by private citizens. Id. at 835-36. The Court also rejected the Mosley assertion that
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tention away from whether the speech was basically incompatible with the
primary purpose of the property, and to focus instead on the classification
the government property.7 Yet, even though the Court had shifted its analysis to the government property instead of the speech, the Court failed to discuss the specific attributes of the military base at issue, preferring instead to
focus on "military installations" as a category.72
The majority opinion in Greer drew a sharp dissent from Justice
Brennan who seemed to realize that the categorical approach adopted by the
Court would likely lead to tradition becoming the determinative issue in any
case dealing with speech on public property.73 However, Greer had set the
stage for the institution of forum analysis as the exclusive vehicle for applying the First Amendment to government property.74
Forum Analysis: The CategoricalApproach
Forum analysis became firmly institutionalized in Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association.7 5 In Perry, the Court
gave perhaps its most comprehensive articulation of what guidelines were to
be applied when faced with questions of First Amendment status of government property.76 The issue in Perry centered on whether a teacher's union
should be allowed to use an interschool mailing system that had already been
made available to a rival union.77 Under a collective bargaining agreement
with the school district, the Perry Education Association would have access
to the mailing system, but no other union would be allowed access. 78 The

public property may become a public forum if it is opened up to speech activity, stating that
"[t]he fact that other civilian speakers and entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear
at Fort Dix did not of itself serve to convert Fort Dix into a public forum." Id.at 838.
71.
Post, supra note 30, at 174 1.
72.
Greer, 424 U.S. at 838. The Court noted that the commanding officer of a military
base has historically always enjoyed the right to exclude civilians, concluding that "[t]he

notion that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally
served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens
is thus historically and constitutionally false." Id.
73.
Id. at 858-59 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan noted, "It bears special note
that the notion of 'public forum' has never been the touchstone of public expression, for a
contrary approach blinds the Court to any possible accommodation of First Amendment values in this case." Id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Post, supra note 30, at 1744-

45 (describing Brennan's attempt to rehabilitate Grayned to counteract the establishment of
the public forum).
74.
Post, supra note 30, at 1743, 1745.
75.
See generally, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983).

76.
77.

Id. at 45-46.
Id.at 38.

78.
Id.The relevant government entities had designated the Perry Education Association
as the exclusive representative of the teachers of Perry Township in an election in 1977. Id.at

40. The Perry Education Association negotiated the contract at issue soon after the election.
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Court ruled that the school had no obligation to allow the union access to the
mailing system.7 9
In giving its rationale for the ruling, the Court designated three types
of government property: public forums, nonpublic forums, and limited public forums."0 Whether a government regulation will be held constitutional
will depend on the nature of the property and the government restriction."'
1. Public Forums
Public forums are those government-owned properties that the government is constitutionally obligated to make available for speech activities.82 Sidewalks and public parks provide the most recognizable examples
of public forums.8 3 The government is allowed to regulate speech within the
forum, but only if the regulation meets certain requirements.84 First, the
regulation must be either content-neutral, or it must be justifiable under strict
scrutiny as illustrated in Carey v. Brown. 5 In Carey, the Supreme Court
struck down an Illinois statute that prohibited picketing in residential areas,
but allowed it if the dwelling was being used as a place of business or was a
place of employment involved in a labor dispute.86 The Court found that the
statute gave preferential treatment to certain kinds of speech, such as speech
related to labor disputes.7 Therefore, it violated the requirement of content
neutrality.8 Regarding the content-neutrality requirement, Justice Brennan
wrote,

Id. The contract only excluded the Perry Local Educators' Association from use of the teachers' mailboxes and the school mailing system. Id. at 41.
79.
Id. at 55.
80.
Id. at 45-46.
81.
Id. at45.
82.
Id. (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)).
83.
Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). In 1965, Professor Harry
Kalven expanded upon the "time out of mind" statement from Hague:
[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public
places are an important facility for public discussion and political process.
They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the
generosity and empathy with which such facilities are made available is
an index of freedom.
Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11-12
(1965).
84.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
85.
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,463 (1980).
86.
Id. at 457.
87.
Id. at 462,471.
88.
Id. at 463. By contrast, in Frisbyv. Schultz, the Court upheld an anti-residential picketing statute despite the fact that the statute was enacted in response to targeted picketing by
abortion protestors of an abortion doctor's home. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476, 477
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[The] government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.
And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities. There is an 'equality of status
in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points
of view an equal opportunity to be heard. 9
The second requirement is that the regulation must be a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction that serves an important government interest and provides adequate alternative places for speech.' For example, in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, the Court upheld a Park
Service regulation that prevented protest groups from actually sleeping in
symbolic tent cities erected in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington,
D.C.9 Although the protestors were allowed to erect the tent cities, in protest of the plight of the homeless, they were not allowed to sleep in the tents
because of a regulation prohibiting camping in the parks.92 While the Court
accepted that sleeping in the tents was a part of the desired expressive conduct, it held that the regulation was a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction.9" The Court also noted the content-neutrality of the regulation,
the important governmental purpose of preserving the attractiveness of the
parks, and the availability of adequate alternative methods of expressing the
desired message."
Finally, the Court has noted that government regulation of speech in
public forums need not use the least restrictive alternative available.9" However, the regulation must still be narrowly tailored to achieve the government's purpose. 96 For example, a New York City regulation requiring that
any concert using the Bandshell in Central Park use sound engineers and city
sound equipment passed constitutional muster in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 97 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had rea-

soned that since less restrictive means of meeting city objectives of noise
reduction were available, the city had failed to use "the least intrusive
means" of achieving its desired result. 9 The United States Supreme Court
responded that while the regulation had to be narrowly tailored to serve the
(1988). Since the statute simply prohibited targeted picketing of residences regardless of
content, it survived the content-neutrality test. Id. at 488.

89.
90.

Carey, 447 U.S. at 463.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).

91.

Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984).

92.
93.
94.

Id. at 292.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.

95.

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).

96.
97.
98.

Id. at 798.
Id. at 786-88.
Id. at 797.
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legitimate government objective, "it need not be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing so.""
2. Nonpublic Forums
A nonpublic forum is a place that the government can close to all
speech activity, subject to the requirement that the regulation be "reasonable" and "viewpoint neutral."'" This category re-invokes the Greer decision allowing the government to limit public access to its property based on
content.'0 ' However, the Perry Court sought to distinguish itself from Greer
by prohibiting "viewpoint discrimination," although the Court never clearly
articulated what made "viewpoint discrimination" different from "content
discrimination" (which it allowed).'0 2
The Perry Court also drew upon the Adderley decision.' 3 In Adderley, the Court set out the basic criteria for review of any regulation of a nonpublic forum:
It is, of course, undisputed that appropriate, limited discretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concerning the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets
for public assemblies may be vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited discretion is exercised with
uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each
application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination ... [and with] a systematic, consistent and just order of treatment, with reference to the convenience of public use of the highways
104

The Court also upheld a government prohibition on posting signs on
publicly owned utility poles in Members of the City Council of the City of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayersfor Vincent.' The Court first noted that the state
had a legitimate interest in preserving the aesthetic appearance of public
99.
Id. at 798.
100.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
101.
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 830-31 (1976). The Court found that the regulation
had been applied in a acceptably neutral fashion and was not unreasonable given the military's historical mandate to provide for the national defense. Id. at 838-39. While admitting
that the regulation might possibly be applied irrationally or arbitrarily, the Court noted that
the plaintiffs had failed to submit any material proving such a claim. Id. at 840.
102.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 49-50.
103.
Id. at 46. "[As we have] stated on several occasions, '[the] State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated."' Id. (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).
104.
Adderley, 385 U.S. at 48 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
105.
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 792, 817 (1984).
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places and could make reasonable regulations to that end. 6 The Court then
refused to designate public utility poles as a public forum noting the lack of
any history supporting the existence of a traditional right of access comparable to public streets and parks. 10 7 The Court concluded that "[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication may be reserved by the State for its intended purposes... as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."'0 8
In brief, a nonpublic forum, as currently construed by the Court, is
subject to rational basis review. Consequently, the government restriction
on the property must merely be rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose, and cannot discriminate on the basis of content."0 9
3. Designated (or Limited) Public Forums
The designated public forum is an attempt to determine what happens when the government allows some groups or individuals freedom of
expression on its property, but selectively denies access to other groups or
individuals. Probably the most influential case dealing with this question is
Police Department v. Mosley."o Mosley dealt with a Chicago ordinance
prohibiting picketing or demonstrating on a public way within 150 feet of
any school building while school was in session, with an exception for
peaceful picketing of a school involved in a labor dispute."' The Supreme
Court stated that once the government opens a forum to some groups, it cannot then exclude others on the mere basis of what they intend to say." 2 The
Court then struck the ordinance down as a content-based exclusion, which
"is never permitted.""..3
In Mosley, the Court set forth the basic concept behind what is now
termed the "designated" or "limited" public forum. As long as the government allows speech on its property, it cannot then pick and choose between
different speech activities on the basis of content." 4 In effect, a limited or
designated public forum had been created. Such a forum is a place that the

106.

Id. at 805.

107.
Id.at 814.
108.
Id. at 814-15 (quoting Perry,460 U.S. at 46).
109.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1097.
110.
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See also Ronnie J. Fischer,
"What's In a Name?": An Attempt to Resolve the "Analytic Ambiguity" of the Designated
and Limited PublicFora, 107 DICK. L. REv. 639 (2003).
111.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94.
112.
ld.at96.
113.
Id. at 100.
114.
Id.at46.
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government could close to speech, but that the government has voluntarily
and affirmatively left open to speech activity." 5
While Mosley set forth the idea behind the designated public forum,
Widmar v. Vincent was the first case to recognize the possibility of its existence independent from other public forums." 6 In Widmar, the Court ruled
that a university that allowed student groups to use school buildings could
not then exclude religious student groups." 7 The Court recognized that the
property in question was very different from a traditional public forum, but
then applied forum analysis determining the exclusion was a content-based
restriction, and therefore subject to the strict scrutiny test (under which, the
exclusion was struck down)." 8
It was not until the Perry decision that the designated public forum
was officially recognized by the Supreme Court, although it was neither
named, nor described in much detail." 9 The Court mentioned a type of forum that neither qualified as a "traditional public forum" or the Court's
newly created "nonpublic forum."' 2 ° Although the Court did not name this
new category of government property, its description of the "nonpublic forum" as "public property that is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication," led to the label of "designated public forum" by
negative implication.''
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,
the Court affirmed Perry's categorical approach, but deviated significantly
from prior interpretations of the nonpublic and designated public forum.'22
In Cornelius, certain advocacy organizations were excluded from participation in a federally created and managed charity drive entitled "The Combined Federal Campaign."'" The United States Supreme Court upheld the
regulation, holding that the Combined Federal Campaign was a nonpublic
forum, and the government's restrictions were reasonable.' 24 The Court,
citing Perry, found that the Combined Federal Campaign qualified as a fo-

115.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983).
116.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
117. Id. at 276. The Widmar Court stated, "Through its policy of accommodating their
meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms." Id. at 267.
118. Id. at 270.
119. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46, 48 (1983).
120.
Id. at45.
121.
Id. See also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998).
122.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 790, 802 (1985).
123. Id. at 790.
124. Id. at 806, 812, 813.
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rum even though it did not really exist in any tangible
location.'25 The Court
126
forum.
then designated the campaign as a nonpublic
The Court in Cornelius agreed with Perry that a designated public
forum can be created when the government opens a place or channel of
communication for general public use. 27 However, the Court then specified
that a designated public forum is created only when the government intended
that the forum be opened for public discourse. 12 ' This focus on government
intent, displayed in Cornelius, would emerge again in United States v.
Kokinda and InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
revealing an increasingly speech restrictive trend on the Supreme Court.'29
Later cases have done little to clarify designated public forum doctrine further than Cornelius. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School Dist., the Court held that by allowing community groups to use
its facilities on weekends, a school district could not then exclude religious
groups.130 Although the Court struck the restriction down as content-based,
and therefore presumptively impermissible, it avoided analyzing the limited
public forum concept in any depth.'3 ' More recently, in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, the Supreme Court similarly managed to avoid explaining the rules governing intermediate categories of public fora.'3 2 However, the Court did explain that speech restrictions on limited public fora do
not receive strict scrutiny, as do traditional public fora.' 33
At present, there is a great deal of confusion over the exact nature of
the designated public forum and what level of judicial review ought to be

125.
Id. at 801 (citing, Perry,460 U.S. at 45).
126.
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. In giving its rationale, the Court stated, "We will not find
that a public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will
we infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity." Id. at 803.
127.
Id.
128.
Id. The Court stated that mere government inaction or permitting of a "limited discourse" is not sufficient for creating a public forum. Id.
129.
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality)
(stating that government creates a public forum only by intentionally opening a nontraditional
forum for public discourse); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S 672,
679 (1992) (stating that a traditional public forum is property that has the free exchange of
ideas as a "principle purpose").
130. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391
(1993).
131.
Id. at 387. See also Fischer,supra note l10, at 639.
132.
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). In Good News,
a Christian youth organization was denied permission to use the school's cafeteria for afterschool meetings. Id. at 103. The Court's avoidance of discussion was facilitated by both
parties' agreement that the school district had created a limited public forum. Id. at 106.
133.
Id.
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applied.'3 4 However, Cornelius and Good News yield at least two general
guidelines. In Cornelius, government intent became the determining factor
in analyzing the designated public forum, replacing more objective criteria.'35 In Good News, rational basis became the appropriate standard of review for the designated public forum rather than the strict scrutiny applied in
Mosley and Widmar.'36 As in public and nonpublic forum jurisprudence, the
recent trend of Supreme Court opinion articulated in Cornelius and Good
News clearly indicates an attitude that is both more restrictive of free speech,
and more permissive of government restrictions.
Government Intent Determines the PublicForum
The forum analysis jurisprudence following Perry had effectively
removed the Grayned approach that had focused on whether the speech conduct was compatible with the primary purpose of the property.137 Instead,
the Court now focused on the objective character and history of the government property. The Court then used these characteristics to classify the
property accordingly and typically, the classification would be determinative
for any First Amendment issues at stake. 138 However, two cases in the early
1990s would challenge this new standard as well, shifting the Court's focus
away from both the nature of the speech and the nature of the property:
United States
v. Kokinda, and InternationalSociety for Krishna Conscious39
ness v. Lee.

134.
For examples of the confusion prevailing among the Federal Courts of Appeals, see
generally Heartbeat of Ottawa County v. City of Port Clinton, 207 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702 n.2
(N.D. Ohio 2002) (noting that limited public forum and designated public forum are interchangeable terms and both are subject to strict scrutiny); Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d
1541, 1553 n.10 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that a limited public forum is a type of designated
public forum and both receive strict scrutiny); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd.
Educ., 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that a limited public forum is a type of nonpublic
forum that receives rational basis review); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir.
1997) (stating a limited public forum can be either a type of designated public forum, or a
type of nonpublic forum receiving either strict scrutiny review or rational basis review respectively); Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a limited public forum is a type of designated public forum, but only receives rational basis review); Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of New York Dep't of
Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that a limited public forum is a type
of designated public forum, but the standard of review depends on whether the speaker falls
within the limiting class set by the government).
135.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985).
136.
Good News, 533 U.S. at 106; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101
(1972); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
137.
Post, supra note 30, at 1749-50.
138.
Id. at 1714-16.
139.
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality); Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality).
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The Kokinda ruling has particular importance for the recent First
Unitarian ruling. 41 In Kokinda, the Court upheld restrictions on solicitations on a portion of sidewalk on United States Postal Service property.' 4' A
plurality Court opinion held that the sidewalk in question did not "have the
characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity.' 42 As Justice O'Connor wrote, "[T]he postal sidewalk was constructed
solely to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business."' 43 The Court then ruled the sidewalk a nonpublic forum and upheld
44
the government restriction under rational basis review.
Kokinda is unusual for two reasons. First, the Court was taking
what had typically been considered the "archetype" of a traditional public
forum (a public sidewalk) and designating it as a nonpublic forum.14' But
secondly, and more importantly, the Court had clearly invoked government
46
intent as the standard for classifying the property as a nonpublic forum.'
Furthermore, in doing so, the Court also marginalized the importance of the
actual objective characteristics of the property in question stating: "The mere
physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis. If they
did, then Greer v. Spock would have been decided differently."' 47 The message was clear - government intent to create a public forum was now more
important than either the nature of the speech or the objective characteristics
of the property. 48 In this sense, Kokinda marks an important shift in Su-

140.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 720 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality).
141.
Id.
142.
Id. at 727. In rejecting the traditional public forum designation, Justice O'Connor
stated that the sidewalk was not meant "to facilitate the daily commerce and life of the
neighborhood or city." Id. The sidewalk was solely meant to assist patrons in accessing the
post office. Id. at 728.
143.
Id. at 727.
144. Id. at 730.
145.
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (stating that once an archetype of a
public forum has been identified it is not appropriate to examine whether special circumstances would support downgrading the property to a less protected forum).
146. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Justice O'Connor stated, "[T]he
government does not create a public forum by ....permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Id. (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). O'Connor also noted that
"[t]he Postal Service has not expressly dedicated its sidewalks to any expressive activity."
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
147.
Id. at 727 (holding that portions of a military base normally open to the public do not
constitute a public forum).
148.
Justice Kennedy criticized the Court's new focus on intent in his concurrence in
Kokinda. He advocated retaining the focus on the nature of the property arguing, "If our
public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain objective characteristics of Government property and its customary use by the public may control the case."
Id. at 737-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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preme Court forum analysis doctrine to a much more speech restrictive
stance. 49
The unusual focus of Kokinda was reaffirmed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, in InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee ("ISKCON'). 5 In ISKCON, the Court ruled that
airport terminals constitute a nonpublic forum.' Noting that large airports
are a relatively recent development, Rehnquist stated that an airport "hardly
qualifies for the description of having 'immemorially ... time out of mind'
been held for the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity."'5 The Court also observed that the airport terminals were not designated public forums since the responsible government entity had not intentionally opened them for speech activity.'
Having designated airports as a
nonpublic forum, the Court turned its consideration to whether the restriction
satisfied the reasonableness standard, and easily concluded that it did.' 54
Although the plurality opinion in ISKCON was a natural outgrowth
of Kokinda, it resulted in a badly fractured Court and has been sharply criticized in scholarly circles.' Justice Kennedy's concurrence is perhaps representative of some of the criticisms leveled at the new government-intentbased approach adopted in Kokinda and ISKCON. Justice Kennedy attacked
both the categorical approach of the Court's forum analysis and its emphasis
on intent, stating: "Our public forum doctrine ought not be a jurisprudence
of categories rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one which grants the government authority to restrict
speech by fiat."' 56 While attacking the Court's analysis, Kennedy repeated

149.
David S. Day, The Public Forum Doctrine's "Government Intent Standard": What
Happenedto Justice Kennedy?, L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L., Spring 2000, at 178.
150.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality). This case came before the Court as two separate petitions for
certiorari and was decided as two companion cases. This note is primarily concerned with the
opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist upholding the ban on solicitation, as well as the
concurrences and dissents to that opinion.
151.
Id. at 683. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged a regulation that limited the distribution of literature and solicitations at an airport to areas outside the
terminals. Id.
152.
Id. at 680 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
153.
Id. at 680. The plaintiffs sought to establish a tradition of speech in airports by showing that speech had historically been a part of activity at various "transportation nodes" such
as railway stations, bus stations, and wharves. Id. at 681. Justice Rehnquist dismissed such
arguments noting that first of all, such "transportation nodes" were traditionally of private
ownership, and second, the case was about airports, not "transportation nodes" generally. Id.
154. Id. at 683.
155.
Day, supra note 30, at 192. For scholarly criticism of ISKCON, see generally
Schutte, supra note 29; Day, supra note 149, at 176, 184-85; R. Alexander Acosta, Revealing
the Inadequacy of the Public Forum Doctrine: InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 269 (1993).
156.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 693-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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the call he had made in Kokinda, advocating a return to an analysis that focuses on the characteristics of the government property:
This analysis is flawed at its very beginning. It leaves the
government with almost unlimited authority to restrict
speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech related purpose for the area, and it leaves
almost no scope for the development of new public forums
absent the rare approval of the government. The Court's error lies in its conclusion that the public forum status of public property depends on the government's defined purpose
for the property, or on an explicit decision by the government to dedicate the property to expressive activity. In my
acview, the inquiry must be an objective one, based on1 the
57
property.
the
of
uses
and
characteristics
tual, physical
The emergence of the government intent standard also indicates that
public forum status is unlikely to be granted to any government property
outside of the traditional categories of streets and parks.' 58 Significantly, any
new and emerging forms of government property will be, by definition, excluded from public forum classification.'5 9 On the other hand, the Court has
shown few qualms in finding nonpublic forums in a variety of contexts. In
United States PostalService v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,
the Court upheld a Postal Service regulation prohibiting the deposit of unstamped "mailable matter" in Postal Service approved mailboxes."6 The
Court reasoned that there was no reason to treat letterboxes any differently
than it had treated military bases in Greer or jails in Adderley and upheld the
regulation and labeled the mailboxes as a nonpublic forum.'I'
Greenburgh illustrates the emergence of the problem of applying forum analysis to new and unconventional forms of government property. It is
in Cornelius v. NAACP, however, that the Supreme Court indicates the kind

157. Id. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 680 (stating that the relatively recent emergence of modem airport terminals in
U.S. history disqualifies them from being considered "made available" for public speech
(quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515)).
159.
Schutte, supra note 29, at 580. See also ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680 (quoting Hague,
307 U.S. at 515).
160. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S. 114,
115(1981).
161.
Id. at 129. After noting the lack of any historical support for mailboxes as public
forums, the Court then founded a large part of its rationale on the fact that private parties
often place locks on mailboxes (which has the same effect on the plaintiffs as the government
regulation) and a designation of mailboxes as public forums might require such locks to be
removed. Id. at 128-29. The Court also noted that the restriction on the plaintiffs' speech
was merely inconvenient since alternative methods of communication were available. Id. at
129.
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of application of forum analysis such property might receive.'6 2 In language
that would be echoed later in the Kokinda and ISKCON decisions, the Cornelius Court reasoned that the "government does not create a public forum
by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."' 63 It is hard to imagine
a form of government property other than streets or parks that could meet
such requirements.' 4
This was the state of public forum analysis at the time First Unitarian was decided. Forum status would be determinative of the permissibility
of the government regulation, and that status, in turn, would be determined
not by considering the nature of the speech activity or the objective characteristics of the government property, but by whether the government intended to create a public forum or not.
Lower Court Approaches
Besides the extensive Supreme Court case law on public forum
analysis, two circuit court decisions figured prominently in the Tenth Circuit
ruling in First Unitarian. The first case, Hawkins v. City and County of
Denver, arose from action by the City and County of Denver removing protesters from the "Galleria" of the Denver Performing Arts Complex. 65 In
analyzing the nature of the property, the Tenth Circuit Court concluded that
the Galleria did not constitute a public forum.' 66 The court distinguished the
Galleria from such traditional public forums as public streets and sidewalks,
noting that the Galleria did not "form part of Denver's automotive, bicycle
or pedestrian transportation grid" and that its purpose was merely "to permit
ingress to and egress from" the Denver Performing Arts Complex facili' 16 7
ties. 9
The Hawkins court also noted that while the property of the Galleria
used to be a public street, that fact did not make the Galleria a public forum. 16'The court explained, "In some sense the government always retains
authority to close a public forum, by selling the property, changing its physical character, or changing its principle use."'169 However, the court noted
that "the government must alter the objective physical character or uses of
162.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
163.
Id. at 802. See also ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality); United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality).
164.
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that government
can show requisite intent merely by denying access to the speaker).
165.
Hawkins v. City and County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1283 (10th Cir.1999).
166.
Id. at 1287. The court stated that the mere fact that the public was allowed to come
and go at will did not render the Galleria a public forum. Id.
167.
Id.

168.
169.

Id.

Id.
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the property,
and bear the attendant costs, to change the property's forum
7°
status.
The second important case is Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas. 7' In Venetian Casino, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to issue an injunction
upon Clark County officials requiring them to recognize and enforce Venetian's right to exclude labor union demonstrators from a sidewalk fronting
the casino on Las Vegas Boulevard.' Due to a street widening project, the
old sidewalk along the street was destroyed and, by agreement with the Venetian Casino, the county was permitted to build a new sidewalk on Venetian's property. 7
The Venetian contended that the old public forum was destroyed and
the new sidewalk was not intended to be dedicated as a public forum.'74 The
court acknowledged that the pre-existing public forum could have been destroyed if the relocation to Venetian's property had fundamentally changed
the sidewalk's character or use. 7 However, the court quickly noted that no
such transformation had taken place with the new sidewalk fronting the Venetian Casino.'76 The court explained that the new sidewalk still performed
the same role and that there was "little to distinguish the replacement sidewalk in front of 1the
Venetian from the connecting public sidewalks to its
77
north and south.'
PRINCIPAL CASE

The sale of the plaza property and terms of the easement were first
challenged in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 78 The
plaintiffs brought summary judgment claims under the First Amendment, the
Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 79 Regarding the First Amendment claim, the
plaintiffs argued that the property remained a public forum where their rights
of expression could not be restricted and that the provisions of the easement
were facially invalid restrictions of their freedom of expression on the prop-

170.
171.
Vegas,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
2001).
179.

Id. at 1288.
See generally Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las
257 F.3d 937 (9th 2001).
Id. at 94 1.
Id. at 943.
Id.
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id. at 945.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (D. Utah
Id. at 1161-62.
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erty. 8' The second claim alleged that the City had violated the Establishment Clause by impermissibly delegating full discretion to the LDS Church
over which members of the public would be allowed to use the easement. 8 '
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the City's imposition of vague, arbitrary,
and discriminatory restrictions on public use of the property while allowing
the Church unrestricted access, constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 82 In addressing the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, the
district court ruled that the plaza constituted a nonpublic forum and applied
rational basis review finding the government restrictions on the easement
permissible.'8 3 The plaintiffs then appealed the case to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.'84 The Tenth Circuit panel overruled
the lower court, finding that the easement actually constituted a traditional
public forum and found the restrictions impermissible under strict scrutiny
review."'
The Decision of the United States Court ofAppealsfor the Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit panel opinion, authored by Judge Seymour, first
examined the plaintiffs' free speech claim.' 86 The court wrote that the issue
before it was "whether the City has the authority to prohibit all expressive
activities on a public easement it reserved across otherwise private property
except for the speech permitted by the private owner of the underlying estate.' ' 7
The court was dismissive of arguments by the City and LDS Church
that the terms of the easement designated it only for pedestrian passage and
expressly excluded speech activities."' The court wrote, "[A] deed does not
insulate government action from constitutional review .... If government
actions taken with respect to the easement violate the Constitution, this simply means the easement terms themselves are unconstitutional .... "'"
The opinion quickly moved to the defendants' central contention
that an easement is not a government property interest at all and therefore,
First Amendment principles should not apply."9 Drawing on rulings from
the United States Supreme Court and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court declared that forum analysis does not
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 1172-73.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th 2002).
Id. at 1128, 1132.
Id.at 1121.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1122.
Id.
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require that the government hold a possessory interest in the underlying land
and that either government regulation or ownership is sufficient for some
sort of First Amendment forum to exist.' 9 ' The court further held that according to Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund,Incorporated, forum analysis does not even require that the government property
have an identifiable location. 92
' Therefore, whether the property interest was
characterized as a government property interest, or a private property interest
burdened by the government, First Amendment principles would still ap93
ply.

The court also disagreed with the defendants' contention that easements do not constitute significant enough property interests to warrant forum analysis. 94 The court reasoned that if the condemnation of an easement
is enough to constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, easements must be constitutionally cognizable in other
areas of the Constitution as well.'95 The court was unsympathetic to LDS
Church arguments that permitting speech on the easement would constitute a
taking of its property by simply remarking that any potential constitutional
conflicts arising in the future were not before the court and need not be considered. 6
The court ended by noting that the public fora status of many existing public streets and sidewalks would be jeopardized by holding that easements cannot be First Amendment fora, since many streets and sidewalks are
mere public easements.' 97 The court also noted that its decision should not
be interpreted as a holding that the First Amendment applies to all easements, but that whether an easement constitutes a public forum will depend

191.

Id. (citing United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453

U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (applying forum principles to privately owned mailboxes "controlled by

the government"); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (holding that title to the
property is not necessarily determinative of public speech rights); Venetian Casino v. Local
Joint Executive Board, 257 F.3d 937, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a sidewalk need
not be government owned to constitute a public forum)).
192. Id. In Cornelius, the Court was willing to classify a federal charity drive as a forum
despite the fact that it is difficult to identify the physical location or "situs" of a charity drive.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (citing Perry

Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
193.
194.
195.
196.

First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1121.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1122-23.
Id. at 1123.

197. Id. The court noted that highways and streets "are public property only in the sense
that they are subject to public use . . . As a rule, and whether a highway is established by
dedication or prescription, or by the direct action of the public authorities, the public acquires
merely an easement of passage, the fee title remaining in the landowner." Id. (citing 39 AM.
JUR. 2D Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 182-83 (1999)).
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upon the characteristics and context of the easement, as well as other practical considerations.1 98
Having concluded the forum analysis was appropriate, the court
opinion proceeded to designate the easement as a traditional public forum.' 99
The court began by rejecting the defendants' argument that the express language in the reservation of easement prevents the easement from being considered a public forum." The court noted, "The government cannot simply
declare the First Amendment status of property regardless of its nature and
public use." '' The opinion specified that it is only in respect to designated
public fora that Supreme Court analysis has focused on government intent to
create a public forum. 0 2 In analysis of traditional public fora, by contrast,
the objective characteristics of the property are centrally important. 0 3
The court determined that the actual purpose of the easement in
question, as stated in the City Ordinance authorizing closure of the street,
was to serve as a pedestrian throughway, "planned and improved so as to
maintain, encourage, and invite public use.' '2 ° Arguments from the defendants claiming that the purpose of the easement was merely ingress and
egress from Church buildings and facilities were dismissed as being at odds
with the publicly and legislatively stated purposes of the plaza. 05
The defendants further argued that the easement in question was
similar to the walkways at issue in the Hawkins decision and therefore, not a
traditional public forum. 2° However, the court distinguished the Hawkins
case from First Unitarian,noting that in Hawkins the walkway at issue was
not a part of the city's transportation grid and was not generally used for any
purpose other than access to and from the Galleria 7 On the contrary, the
court felt the easement at issue was better compared
to the easement that was
28
ruled a public sidewalk in Venetian Casino.
The court then considered whether speech activities were incompatible with the purpose of the easement. 20 9 The court noted that the district
court had erred in its analysis of incompatibility by declaring speech activi198.
First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1124.
199.
Id.at 1128.
200.
Id. at 1124.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id. at 1125 (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
698, 699 (1992)).
204.
Id. at 1126.
205.
Id. at 1126-27.
206.
Id. at 1127.
207.
Id.
208.
Id. at 1128.
209.
Id.
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ties incompatible with an "ecclesiastical park" instead of the actual easement
itself21 Providing an "ecclesiastical park" had been the purpose of the surrounding property, not the purpose of the easement."' Furthermore, the
court noted that speech activity is historically compatible with spaces dedicated to pedestrian passage. 1 2 Arguments from the defendants claiming that
expressive conduct would interfere with the LDS Church's use of the surrounding property were dismissed as presenting separate issues not before
the court in this case.2 3 The court concluded by ruling that the fact that the
pedestrian passageway in question traverses private property does not defeat
its status as a public forum.2 4
Having determined that the nature of the easement is not incompatible with speech activities, the court proceeded to determine whether the
property had traditionally been open to expressive public activity. 5 While
acknowledging that the government always retains authority to close a public forum either by selling it or by altering it sufficiently, the court did not
believe that the principle use of the easement in question had changed sufficiently to close its status as a traditional public forum. 6 In fact, the purpose
of providing a pedestrian throughway was identical to the purpose served by
the sidewalks that formerly occupied the property and the City had deliberately retained the most important functions of the property.21 7 Therefore, it
had also retained the functions associated with speech activities. 2 " In effect,
the City was attempting to change the forum's status without bearing the
attendant costs associated with such change. 9

210. Id.
211.
Id.
212. Id.
213.
Id.at 1129.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216. Id. at 1130. The question of whether the City and the LDS Church had altered the
property sufficiently to change its forum status was a crucial component of the Utah District
Court decision. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 116871 (D. Utah 2001). Regarding the changed nature and use of the plaza, the District Court
stated, "[B]y purchasing the Property and creating thereon a religiously oriented pedestrian
plaza connecting two privately owned blocks of property, the CBP sufficiently changed the
physical character and principal use or function of the Property so as to terminate its status as
a public forum." Id. at 1171. Having determined that the City's retained easement did not
constitute a "public forum," the District Court held that the easement constituted a "nonpublic
forum" and was therefore subject to rational basis review. Id. at 1172. Reasoning that the
prohibited speech activities were incompatible with the property right held by the city
(namely, that of a mere pedestrian easement), the restrictions on the property were indeed
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id.
217. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1130-31 (10th Cir.
2002).
218.
Id. at 1131.
219. Id. at 1131. Justice Seymour wrote,
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Having ruled that the easement constituted a traditional public forum, the court had little difficulty in finding that the restrictions that had
been placed on the easement were invalid.22 ° Citing to Perry, the court
stated that the government may not prohibit all communicative activity
" ' The court observed that the essential contention of
within a public forum.22
the defendants was that the public has no speech rights at all, except as the
LDS Church permitted. The court then noted that the United States Supreme
Court had held such broad bans unconstitutional even in nonpublic forum
analysis.222 The court concluded by noting that although the plaintiffs had
moved for partial summary judgment only on their First Amendment claim,
the Tenth Circuit ruling would dispose of the plaintiffs' remaining claims
because all of the claims rested on the easement restrictions that the Court
now held invalid.2"
ANALYSIS

The Tenth Circuit ruling in First Unitarian represents both a break
with the trend of recent United States Supreme Court forum analysis, and a
return to the more speech protective stance of older Supreme Court case law.
In First Unitarian, the Tenth Circuit deemphasizes the government intent
standard articulated in ISKCON, in favor of the standard set forth in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in ISKCON. Although the idea of holding a mere
concurrence as binding Supreme Court precedent is questionable, and even
more questionable considering that Kennedy's concurrence disagreed with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion on several points, the Kennedy
test does seem preferable to Rehnquist's overly deferential government intent approach. Thus, while the Tenth Circuit opinion is questionable as an
interpretation of current binding Supreme Court jurisprudence, it also arrives
at a result that is both more sensible to the relevant facts of the case and in
greater harmony with the true essence of the First Amendment.
Rejecting the Intent Standard
In First Unitarian, the Tenth Circuit was faced with the charge of
determining whether or not a publicly owned pedestrian easement over priWe are convinced the City has attempted to change the forum's status
without bearing the attendant costs, by retaining the pedestrian easement
but eliminating the speech previously permitted on the same property. In
effect, the City wants to have its cake and eat it too, but it cannot do so
under the First Amendment.
Id.
220.
Id. at 1132.
221.
Id. (citing, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
222.
First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1132.
223.
Id.at 1120,1133.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss2/9

26

Rogers: Constitutional Law - A Forum by Any Other Name ... Would Be Just

2004

CASE NOTE

vate property should be ruled a public forum.224 While the Tenth Circuit's
decision to apply forum analysis to an easement does not seem unusual in
light of recent Supreme Court case law, the court's designation of the easement as a traditional public forum is probably less in keeping with the current trend of Supreme Court opinion." In arriving at the classification of
the easement as a public forum the Tenth Circuit invoked ISKCON and
Kokinda in a manner that is initially somewhat confusing.
The Tenth Circuit's decision to apply forum analysis to the easement
is largely unproblematic. While the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to rule on whether a government easement can constitute a traditional public forum, it would not be a large step for the Court to do so. As
the Tenth Circuit opinion noted, United States v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Associations shows that government possessory interest in or title to
the underlying land is not a prerequisite for forum analysis.226 While the
Court upheld the restrictions, the ruling seemed to clearly indicate mere government ownership or regulation can subject a piece of property to First
Amendment forum analysis.227
Furthermore, as the First Unitariancourt noted, it may not even be
necessary for the government to have any property interest at all. 228 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund,Inc., the Supreme Court
applied forum analysis to the "Combined Federal Campaign," a federally run
charity drive. u9 Despite the fact that a charity drive did not constitute a

224. Id. at 1124.
225.
See, e.g., Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (refusing to designate public utility poles as public forums
on the grounds that they lacked a traditional right of public access); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (a designated public forum is only
created when the government intends that the forum be opened for public use); United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality) (noting that the post office
sidewalk was distinguishable from traditional sidewalks because its primary purpose was to
facilitate pedestrian passage and stating that the sidewalk was not a public forum because the
Postal Service had not "expressly dedicated" it to expressive activity); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-81 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality) (refusing
to consider tradition of speech within "transportation nodes," instead narrowing the focus to
"airport terminals" and reaffirming that a traditional public forum must have free exchange of
ideas as its "primary purpose").
226. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1122 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)). In Greenburgh,the Court applied forum
analysis to restrictions placed on government owned mailboxes even though there was no
government real estate involved. Council of Greenburgh,453 U.S. at 129.
227.
Id.
228.
First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1122 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800, 801 (1985)).
229.
Cornelius,473 U.S. at 788.
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"property interest" in the traditional sense, the Court still applied forum
analysis and designated the charity drive as a nonpublic forum.230
The case for including easements in the realm of possible traditional
public forums is made stronger by the fact that easements are already recog" ' The First Unitarnized as constitutionally cognizable property interests.23
ian court noted that government condemnation of an easement is sufficient
to qualify as a taking under the Fifth Amendment.232 If easements are constitutionally recognizable as compensable property rights under the Fifth
Amendment, it seems odd to argue that they are not recognizable under the
First Amendment.
The court's decision to apply forum analysis seems in harmony with
the current trend of public forum jurisprudence.233 It is after the decision to
apply forum analysis that the court seems to run into trouble as the defendants' defense relating to the deed that conveyed the easement presents the
court with a more difficult problem. The court summarizes the defendants'
argument as follows:
The City and the LDS Church respond that the easement
cannot be a public forum because of express language in the
reservation of easement stating the space does not constitute
a public forum. They also argue the physical characteristics
of the former Main Street have been changed sufficiently by
development of the plaza to eliminate any public forum that
existed along the former Main Street.234
The defendants' first contention is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court's
recent focus on government intent as the determining factor in deciding forum status.235 If the Supreme Court has found that the government can evidence intent to create a nonpublic forum by simply denying certain groups
230.
Id. at 806. It is, of course, worth noting that neither Greenburgh nor Cornelius went
so far as to rule that these more unconventional forms of government property were anything
more than nonpublic forums. Still, it seems unquestionable that forum analysis is increasingly being applied in unusual contexts. See, e.g., John J. Brogan, Speak and Space: How the
Internet is Going to Kill the First Amendment as We Know It, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 1-3
(2003) (criticizing the current forum analysis framework, and discussing how such a framework will inevitably break down in the face of new communication venues such as the internet).
231.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122-23 (10th Cir.
2002).
232.
Id. at 1122 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
233.
Farber & Nowak, supra note 30, at 1221-22; Schutte, supra note 29, at 564 (stating
that the Court is increasingly relying on forum analysis in determining when the public may
use government controlled property for speech purposes); Dienes, supra note 30, at 110-15.
234.
First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1124.
235.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality).
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access to the property, the addition of an express written document denying
public forum status entirely ought to be even more decisive against finding a
public forum. 236 The defendants' second contention that the characteristics
of the property had been changed seems to have anticipated that the Tenth
Circuit might fail to apply the "government intent standard," and use instead,
a test focusing on the objective characteristics of the property such as the
tests used in Greer and Perry, and more recently advocated by Justice Kennedy.237
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the problem of the deed of conveyance.38 Interestingly, the court quickly rejects the government intent
standard, declaring, "We first reject the contention that the City's express
intention not to create a public forum controls our analysis." 9 To back up
this assertion, the Tenth Circuit cites both ISKCON and Kokinda.240 The
choice of supporting cases is strange however, as both opinions are widely
regarded as advancing the very intent standard that the Tenth Circuit was
trying to reject.24'
In ISKCON, Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion made
prominent reference to government intent as the controlling factor in determining public forum status.242 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by stating, "In
Cornelius, we noted that a traditional public forum is property that has as 'a
principle purpose ....the free exchange of ideas.' 24 3 He continued, "The
236. Id. at 680-81.
237. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) (holding that political campaigning
activities are inconsistent with the use and purpose of a military base); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) ("The existence of a right of access to
public property and the standard by which limitations must be evaluated differ depending on
the character of the property at issue."). See also ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 698-99 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737-38 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
238. First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1124.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at
738 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
241. See, e.g., Schutte, supra note 29, at 568; Day, supra note 149, at 179, 183; Buchanan,
supra note 30, at 949, 965.
242. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 679 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality).
243. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985)). Interestingly, the easement in question in First Unitarian would probably fail to
qualify as a traditional public forum under this criteria since its "principle purpose" is to
facilitate pedestrian traffic, not provide for free exchange of ideas. Indeed, most streets and
sidewalks would probably fail to qualify for public forum status, as Justice Kennedy pointed
out:
The notion that traditional public forums are properties that have public
discourse as their principal purpose is a most doubtful fiction . . . . It
would seem apparent that the principle purpose of streets and sidewalks,
like airports, is to facilitate transportation, not public discourse, and we
have recognized as much ....Thus under the Court's analysis, even the
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decision to create a public forum must instead be made 'by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."2 While it might be
possible to limit these statements as referring only to designated public forums, the Rehnquist opinion certainly contradicts any assertion that government intent is not the primary and controlling factor in public forum analysis.245

Kokinda is equally problematic for the Tenth Circuit opinion. As
noted above, the Kokinda Court even denied public forum status to a public
sidewalk. 246 After noting that "the mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis," the Court proceeded to discuss, at
length, the government purpose in constructing the sidewalk.247 The Court
then declared,
The Postal Service has not expressly dedicated its sidewalks
to any expressive activity .... To be sure, individuals or
groups have been permitted to leaflet, speak, and picket on
postal premises, but a regulation prohibiting disruption, and
a practice of allowing some speech activities on postal property do not add up to the dedication of postal property to
speech activities. We have held that the government does
not create a public forum by . . . permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional
forum for public discourse. 248

quintessential public forums would appear to lack the necessary elements
of what the Court defines as a public forum.
Id. at 696-97.
244. Id. at 680 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802) (emphasis added). While one might
hope that the Main Street plaza's history as a public thoroughfare might allow it to qualify as
a traditional public forum even under Rehnquist's test, Kokinda and ISKCON give little reason for such optimism. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (O'Connor, J., plurality); ISKCON, 505 U.S.
at 681(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality). In Kokinda, the Court rejected an actual sidewalk for public forum classification on the rather disingenuous argument that while sidewalks may have a
tradition of free speech, sidewalks in front of post offices do not. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727
(O'Connor, J., plurality). Similarly, in ISKCON, Rehnquist refused to focus on nodes of
transportation generally, and instead focused on the relatively short history of airports.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 681 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality). Such narrow Court focus renders the
fate of a mere public access easement over private property uncertain at best.
245. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "The decision to create a
public forum must instead be made by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse." Id. (citing Cornelius,437 U.S. at 802).
246.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
247.
Id. at 727-28.
248.
Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
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The Court concluded by ruling that the public sidewalk was a nonpublic
forum, subject to rational basis review.249
However, neither the citations to Kokinda, or ISKCON, in the Tenth
Circuit opinion reference to the Supreme Court plurality opinionsY ° In both
cases, the Tenth Circuit cites Kennedy's concurrences, and not the O'Connor
and Rehnquist plurality opinions.2 s' What makes the choice of cited authority most interesting is that Kennedy's concurrences in both cases are highly
critical of the methods used by the plurality in applying forum analysis.5 2 In
both cases, Kennedy rejects the plurality's new government intent test and
advocates instead, a test focusing on the objective characteristics of the
property.25 3 It is Kennedy's test, rather than the intent test that the Tenth
Circuit adopts in First Unitarian.5 4 In essence, the First Unitariandecision
rejects the recent, highly deferential approach of recent Supreme Court pluralities, in favor of a different test advocated in a concurrence that is highly
critical of the plurality approach.2 5
However, since the ISKCON decision utterly failed to render a useable majority opinion, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Kennedy's opinion is
probably justified. The court explained, "We cite Justice Kennedy's concurrence as controllingSupreme Court precedent because his concurrence provided the fifth vote on the narrowest grounds. 256 It does seem clear that
Kennedy's concurrences provided a necessary "swing-vote" in both
ISKCON and Kokinda.2
In absence of a bona fide majority opinion to
guide the lower courts, it is hard to fault the Tenth Circuit for preferring

249.
Id.
250.
Id.
251.
Id. (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 694
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). It should be
noted that the Tenth Circuit is not bound to follow mere plurality opinions that have failed to
gamer support of a Court majority. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). However, the Tenth Circuit's preference for Kennedy's test places the court in conflict with the
increasingly deferential and speech-restrictive trend of Supreme Court opinion. See Schutte,
supra note 29, at 566-68; Dienes, supra note 30, at 110.
252.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 693-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I believe that the Court's
public forum analysis in these cases is inconsistent with the values underlying the Speech and
Press Clauses of the First Amendment."); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[B]ecause of the wide range of activities that the Government permits to take place on this
postal sidewalk, it is more than a nonpublic forum ....If our public forum jurisprudence is to
retain vitality, we must recognize that certain objective characteristics of Government property and its customary use by the public may control the case.").
253. Id.
254.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1125 (1 0th Cir. 2002).
255. Id.at 1124-25.
256. Id.at 1125 n.6 (emphasis added) (citing Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1982
(10th Cir. 1999); Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
257.
See generally, U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004

31

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 4 [2004], No. 2, Art. 9
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 4

Kennedy's concurrence, even if that concurrence seems contrary to the trend
of Court opinion throughout the past several decades.258
Whatever the validity of the Tenth Circuit's decision to follow Kennedy's objective characteristics test, it is clear that the court has rejected
Rehnquist's government intent focus. 259 Having rejected the intent
test, the
20
court then explicitly sets forth the Kennedy test from ISKCON.
After grasping hold of Kennedy's reference to compatibility of
speech as a relevant factor, the Tenth Circuit also cites O'Connor's concurrence in ISKCON, stating that "the question we address is whether expressive activity is compatible with the purposes and uses to which the government has lawfully dedicated the property. ' 261 As with Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, the Tenth Circuit holds O'Connor's concurrence as controlling
since it2 also provided the "fifth vote on the narrowest grounds in this
26
case."
The result of the Tenth Circuit Court's reliance on the Kennedy and
O'Connor concurrences is an outright rejection of the government intent

258.
Interestingly, since the Kokinda and ISKCON decisions, Kennedy has retreated from
his firm position in opposition to the "intent test." Writing for the majority in the more recent
case of Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, Justice Kennedy seems to
abandon his objective characteristics test in favor of Renquist's focus on government intent.
523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998). See also Day, supra note 149, at 174, 192. The Tenth Circuit
opinion in First Unitariannever addresses this inconsistency.
259.
After declaring Kennedy's concurrences as controlling, the court then noted that "for
property that is or has traditionally been open to the public, objective characteristics are more
important and can override express government intent to limit speech." First Unitarian,308
F.3d at 1125 (citing Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
260. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1125 (citing ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 698-99 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)). Kennedy described his test as follows:
If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the
actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the government
indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with
those uses, the property is a public forum. The most important considerations in this analysis are whether the property shares physical similarities
with more traditional public forums, whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to the property, and whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with the uses
to which the government has as a factual matter dedicated the property.
Id. (emphasis added).
261.
First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1125-26 (citing ISKON, 505 U.S. at 686 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
262.
Id. at 1126. Even under the Marks decision, it is difficult to see how two different
concurrences can be used simultaneously as the official holding in ISKCON. The Tenth Circuit almost seems to be picking and choosing among the separate concurrences for the ideas it
most agrees with.
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focus of ISKCON and Kokinda.263 Instead, the court adopts a test based on
the objective characteristics of the property, with a heavy focus on whether
the speech is incompatible with the basic use of the property. 264 In this
to the tests used in older Supreme
sense, First Unitarianrepresents a return
2 65
Court cases such as Grayned and Greer.
A Better Public Forum Analysis?
The permissibility or impermissibility of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Supreme Court jurisprudence aside, the question becomes
whether the court's opinion represents a better application of the First
Amendment than that found in the plurality opinions of ISKCON and
Kokinda. This note contends that the First Unitarian decision is not only
more protective of speech than the ISKCON or Kokinda pluralities, but it is
also a more common-sense application of the values underlying the First
Amendment as well.
First Unitarian'smore protective stance towards freedom of speech
derives from its application of forum analysis.266 Recent Supreme Court
history has made clear that determining forum status for a parcel of government property is determinative of whether government restrictions on that
property will be upheld.267 Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, a
finding of a nonpublic forum by the court is generally fatal to any speech
interests in question. 26' As Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized in ISKCON,
while a government regulation on a traditional or designated public forum is
"subject to the highest scrutiny," limitations on a nonpublic forum are subject only to the requirement that the regulation be reasonable, and not directed at the specific content of the speech.269 In short, government restrictions on traditional public fora will receive strict scrutiny, while restriction
on nonpublic fora need only be reasonable.270
The result is that speech rights on nonpublic fora receive, essentially, no protection at all. Professor C. Thomas Dienes notes,
263. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730
(O'Connor, J., plurality).
264. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1125.
265. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("The crucial question is
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity a particular place at a particular time."). See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-39 (1976) (discussing why the attributes of certain military base property show that the property is not a
public forum).
266. First Unitarian,308 F.3d at Ii 24-31.
267. Dienes, supra note 30, at 110.
268. Id. at 120 ("[T]he conceptualistic, nonpublic-forum doctrine predetermines the judicial answer through the labeling process.").
269. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678-79 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)).
270. Id.
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The failure to successfully challenge government regulation
of the nonpublic forum is not hard to understand. The reasonableness standard of judicial review used in such cases is
essentially no review at all. Indeed, the Court regularly refers to it as rationality review. Those familiar with the
plethora of due process and equal protection cases in which
rationality review is employed will appreciate the outcomedeterminative character of the standard. These cases provide ample testimony that invocation of rationalityreview is
simply a means of articulatingjudicial deference to gov2 7'
ernmentaljudgment.
In light of the judicial deference currently surrounding the nonpublic
forum, it is apparent that the result of the court's forum analysis will be cru272
cial to the success of a free speech claim concerning government property.
It follows that if current Supreme Court analysis of such speech is to offer
any First Amendment protection 2at73 all, it must offer that protection in the
process of classifying the property.
Unfortunately, recent Supreme Court case law indicates that unless
the speech occurred in a park or on a public sidewalk, it is unlikely that the
property will be classified as a public forum.274 While the Main Street plaza
at issue in First Unitarian,bears great resemblance to a traditional sidewalk,
the ISKCON and Kokinda cases illustrate that, at least in respect to traditional or designated public forums, the Court is currently extremely reluctant
to expand its definitions to include less conventional types of government
property.275 In Kokinda, instead of focusing on sidewalks generally, the
271.
272.
poses,
273.

274.

Dienes, supra note 30, at 117 (emphasis added).
Day, supra note 30, at 178 ("The non-forum standard dictated, for all practical purgovernment victory as a result.").
Dienes, supra note 30, at 110.
CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 32, at 1102.

See also, ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 679-80

(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality) (stating that streets and parks have a long tradition of availability
for speech, but concluding that airports brief history fails to qualify them as having a sufficient tradition of availability for speech).

275. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1102. Chemerinsky notes that the Court's narrow
focus makes it difficult to designate a place as a public forum based on a tradition of availability for speech. Id. Justice Brennan's dissent in ISKCON is openly hostile to the plurality's limitation of the "public forum" classification to certain "archetypes of property," stating,
To treat the class of such forums as closed by their description as "traditional," taking that word merely as a charter for examining the history of
the particular public property claimed as a forum, has no warrant in a
Constitution whose values are not to be left behind in the city streets that
are no longer the only focus of our community life. If that were the line
of our direction, we might as well abandon the public forum doctrine altogether.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Court chose to focus specifically on sidewalks in front of a post office.276 In
ISKCON, the Court avoided considering places of transportation generally,
but instead chose the narrow focus of airports. 277 Having narrowed the focus
of inquiry, the Court asked whether the airport in ISKCON, and the post office sidewalk in Kokinda, had a tradition of availability for speech activities
and easily concluded that they did not. 27" Likewise, when considering
whether the primary purpose of the location was for speech, the Court also
easily answered in the negative.279
The new government intent standard articulated in the ISKCON and
Kokinda pluralities compounds the difficulty in obtaining public forum
status. The process of analysis via categorization is already likely to obscure
First Amendment concerns.280 Making that classification dependant on a
subjective inquiry as to whether the government entity intended to create a
public forum buries First Amendment concerns entirely.2"'
It seems difficult to find a situation in which a government entity
would be unable to show intent to keep the property as a nonpublic forum.28 2
Indeed, it seems that the government could evidence this intent merely by
excluding an individual or group. The remarks of Justice Blackmun, in his
dissent in Cornelius,are instructive in this respect:

276.
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990).
277.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 681 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality).
278.
Id. at 680.
279. Id. at 682. In Cornelius, the Court stated that a traditional public forum is property
that has as "a principle purpose .... the free exchange of ideas." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
Justice Kennedy noted that it is doubtful whether even streets and parks would qualify under
such a strict definition of the public forum. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 696-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
280.
Farber & Nowak, supra note 30, at 1224. The authors state,
Our objection to public forum analysis is not that it invariably yields
wrong results (although it sometimes does), but that it distracts attention
from the first amendment values at stake in a given case. It almost certainly will hinder lower court judges from focusing on those values or
from making sense of Supreme Court precedent. Classifying a medium
of communication as a public forum may cause legitimate governmental
interests to be thoughtlessly brushed aside; classifying it as something
other than a public forum may lead courts to ignore the incompatibility of
the challenged regulations with first amendment values.
Id.
281.
The result is that judicial analysis is moved away from any discussion of the speech in
question in favor of a narrow discussion of whether the government intended speech to occur
on the property. Furthermore, the Kokinda decision indicates that even parks and sidewalks
may not be immune to government intent. Day, supra note 30, at 187 ("By applying the
government intent standard to a traditional forum like a sidewalk, however, Kokinda pointedly threatens the anticensorial core of the free speech doctrine.").
282.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The Court's analysis empties the limited-public forum concept of meaning and collapses the three categories of public
forum, limited public forum, and nonpublic forum into two.
The Court makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a particular class of speakers is a limited
public forum. If the Government does not create a limited
public forum unless it intends to provide an "open forum"
for expressive activity, and if the exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not intend to create
such a forum, no speaker challenging denial of access will
ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited public forum. The very fact that the Government denied access to
the speaker indicates that the Government did not intend to
provide an open forum for expressive activity, and under the
Court's analysis of that fact alone would demonstrate that
the forum is not a limited public forum.2" 3
If, as Rehnquist argued in ISKCON, the government may only create a public forum "by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse," the Court's analysis of whether a public forum has been created
might well boil down to: "if the government says there isn't a public forum
....there isn't a public forum."24 Because the highly deferential rational
basis review accompanies the nonpublic forum, it is hard to see that
Rehnquist's version of forum analysis protects First Amendment interests at
all.28 5
The First Unitariandecision wisely avoids such negative results by
advocating Justice Kennedy's focus on the objective characteristics of the
property, and the compatibility of that property with speech activity.286 In
First Unitarian, this focus yielded a more common-sense treatment of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the plaza controversy. In truth, there
was little substantive difference between the traditional public forum existing on the Main Street property prior to the sale, and the public access easement retained after the sale.287
The central contention in First Unitarian,and the argument that ultimately carried the day in the district court, was that the property had been
sufficiently altered by the LDS Church to eradicate the public forum that
283.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 825 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Though Blackmun's remarks were directed toward Court analysis of a
potential designatedpublic forum, his point seems more generally applicable to all classifications of forum analysis as is suggested by Justice Brennan's use of Blackmun's statement in
his dissent in Kokinda. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality).
285.
Dienes, supra note 30, at 117.
286.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2002).
287.
Id. at 1128.
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existed there before the sale of the property. 28 However, as the Tenth Circuit correctly pointed out, it was the easement, and not the entire plaza, that
constituted the property in controversy.2" 9 Narrowing the analysis to the
easement, one actually finds little difference, in either the character or use,
between the sidewalks that existed before the sale, and the easement that
remained after the sale. The language of the easement itself reads, "Grantor
reserves an easement over and across the surface of the Property for pedestrian access and passage ... ,290 As the Tenth Circuit opinion noted, this is
the exact function that the pre-existing sidewalks on the Main Street property fulfilled.2 9'
Furthermore, the defendants' contention that the purpose of the
property in question was merely to provide ingress and egress to and from
Church facilities is not convincing. First, as the court noted, such an argument is contradicted by the plain language of the easement itself, which calls
for "pedestrian access and passage., 292 Second, while the defendants cited to
the Tenth Circuit decision in Hawkins for support, the new Main Street plaza
is clearly different from the Denver Performing Arts Center Galleria at issue
in Hawkins. The Galleria in Hawkins was an isolated pedestrian area that
was unusable for throughway pedestrian traffic, and its only real use was for
access to the Performing Arts Center. 293 The Main Street Plaza, by contrast,
is certainly usable to pedestrians passing through to Salt Lake City's downtown attractions.294
However, all other contentions aside, the First Unitarianruling may
be most appropriate because it merely gives effect to the City's true (as opposed to written) intent concerning the plaza. Even before the sale was
agreed upon, various entities of the City were stressing the need to keep the
property open to public access, and the Planning Commission even urged
making the sale contingent on the condition that public expression would be
preserved.295 The subsequent City Council ordinance approving the sale
required the City to retain an easement "planned and improved so as to
296 As we have already seen,
maintain, encourage, and invite public use ....
29
7
the easement itself retained similar language. The court also noted that the
City indicated that developing downtown pedestrian malls through street

288.

First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1171 (D. Utah

2001).
289.
290.
291.

First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1130.

292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.at lllS, 1131.
Hawkins v.City and County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1119.
Id. at 1118.

296.
297.

Id.
Id.

Id.
at lli8.
Id.
at 1130.
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closures had been a stated goal of City planning for almost forty years.298 In
fact, the City even admitted that it would not have agreed to the sale without
the easement.299 It seems apparent that the City intended the plaza to be
something substantially more than a mere walkway for accessing LDS
Church facilities.3"
Interestingly, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
seemed to be of an entirely different mind regarding the role of the proposed
plaza from the outset.3"' Even in presenting their case before the Tenth Circuit, the City and LDS Church disagreed on what effect enforcing free
speech on the property would have." 2 While the City contended that the
City's easement would survive without the restrictions, the LDS Church
argued that the easement would be eliminated entirely, turning the plaza into
completely private property. 0 3 In adopting the restrictions in the reservation
of easement, the City seemed to have been trying to give the Church what it
wanted while still getting "a little bit of Paris" in its downtown. As Judge
Seymour noted, the City did seem to be attempting to "have its cake and eat
it too."3"
However, the advantages of the Tenth Circuit's approach go further
than simply promoting a more common-sense forum analysis. The extent of
these advantages is seen in the Tenth Circuit decision's stark contrast to the
opinion of the Utah District Court. The district court analyzed the changed
character of the surrounding property, and the intent of the City of Salt Lake,
and arrived at the conclusion that the pedestrian easement was a nonpublic
forum. A brief discussion of the inherent problems with the district court
ruling may help clarify the advantages of the approach taken by the Tenth
Circuit.
The most immediate disadvantage of the Utah court's decision is
that such a ruling would jeopardize the forum-status of parcels of land al298.

1d. at 1126.

299.

Id.

300.
This is not to say that such apparent intent would trump the City's written intent when
subjected to the highly deferential Rehnquist test from ISKCON.
301.
Rebecca Walsh, New Plaza Proposed On Main, S.L. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
While the City seemed to be hoping for a nice addition to its pedestrian grid, the LDS Church
seemed to be planning on an "ecclesiastical park," forming a continuation of its sizeable
downtown campus. Id. Perhaps with hindsight, it is easy to see trouble brewing even at the
announcement of plans to develop the new plaza in late 1998. Id. At the news conference
Church President Gordon B. Hinckley told reporters, "This beautiful place will inspire faith
where now there is only asphalt and moving cars." Id. In contrast, Mayor Deedee Corradini
commented, "This plaza is going to be another element of making our city pedestrian-friendly
....We'll have people out of their cars. We're hoping that rather than go somewhere else,
they'll walk down Main Street and shop." Id.
302.
First Unitarian,308 F.3d at 1126.
303.
Id.
304. Id.at 1131.
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ready considered traditional public forums. The Tenth Circuit opinion noted
that many existing public sidewalks and streets, the "archetype" of a traditional public forum, are mere government easements." 5 The threat of endangering so many established public forums makes it very difficult to dispute the Tenth Circuit interpretation.?
Furthermore, upholding the district court ruling would have the detriment of substantially lowering the bar for government entities wishing to
close down existing public forums. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in
ISKCON, wrote that "when property is a protected public forum the State
may not by fiat assert broad control over speech or expressive activities; it
must alter the objective physical characteristics and bear the attendant
costs.""'
The danger behind upholding the district court decision would be
that government actors might enact marginal changes to a traditional public
forum and then declare that its characteristics had been altered sufficiently to
close the forum to speech rights. 8 An important benefit of the Tenth Circuit decision in First Unitarianis that it keeps such government actors honest. As Judge Seymour remarked, "[T]he City may not exchange the public's constitutional rights even for other public benefits such as the revenue
from a sale, and certainly may not provide a public space or passage conditioned on a private actor's desire that that space be expression-free.""3 9 In
light of such serious detriments, a little court-enforced caution on the part of
parties to public-to-private land sales does not seem so unbearable.
305. Id. at 1123.
306.
In light of the recent contortions that the pluralities in Kokinda and ISKCON have
performed in accommodating the government's stated intent for its own property, it is not
difficult to imagine how an easement might be narrowly excluded from public forum classification in spite of its similarities to other archetypes of public forums. Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in ISKCON noted that a narrow focus on intent even poses a threat to the archetypes of public forums:
It would seem apparent that the principal purpose of streets and sidewalks
....is to facilitate transportation, not public discourse ....Similarly, the
purpose for the creation of public parks may be as much for beauty and
open space as for discourse. Thus under the Court's analysis, even the
quintessential public forums would appear to lack the necessary elements
of what the Court defines as a public forum.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696-97 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
307.
Id. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
308.
This appears to have been the concern of the Tenth Circuit when it stated, "We are
convinced the City has attempted to change the forum's status without bearing the attendant
costs." First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1131, 1132. The court also noted, "The City must bear
the attendant costs .... If it wants an easement, the City must permit speech on the easement.
Otherwise, it must relinquish the easement so the parcel becomes entirely private." Id. at
1132.
Id. (citing Hawkins v. City and County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1288 (1999)).
309.
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CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in First UnitarianChurch
of Salt Lake City is a clearly reasoned, common-sense approach to a somewhat ambiguous area of First Amendment law. In the past several decades,
forum analysis has evolved from a test that focuses on the compatibility of
free speech with government property, to a jurisprudence of superficial categories. Through application of modem forum analysis, recent Supreme
Court decisions have almost entirely avoided any serious discussion of the
societal balance that must be struck between the demands of the First
Amendment and government interests. Instead, we are now regularly treated
to a mere exercise in judicial name-calling. The entire success of a free
speech claim now hinges on whether the government property in question
receives the label of "public" or "nonpublic" forum. Once the label is attached all conversation stops. What's in a name? Everything, it would
seem.
Even more disturbingly, the recent Court decisions in Cornelius,
Kokinda, and ISKCON show a new trend that would put the whole key to
forum analysis, the determination of the correct label, into the hands of the
state. In essence, Chief Justice Rehnquist's intent test from ISKCON asserts
that citizens only have a right to free speech when the government intends
for them to have it. In view of the United States' long history of First
Amendment jurisprudence, it seems self-evident that the government must
be required to produce a better rationale for denial of free speech rights than
simply declaring: "because I said so."
Cases such as Greenburgh and Cornelius indicate that the Court's
application of public forum analysis is being inexorably drawn into more
and more unusual contexts of government-controlled property. The increasing demands of new mediums of communication, such as the internet, will
make it increasingly difficult for the Court to resist new inclusions into the
public forum category. If nothing else, the cases clearly show that the character of public speech has been greatly expanded beyond the traditional contexts of the soapbox and the picket line. What is needed is a framework of
court analysis that does more than simply ask where Americans exercised
their speech rights in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Rigid historical restrictions are simply inadequate for dealing with the fast changing
character of modem public speech. If the Court's model of the public forum
is to avoid becoming a legal anachronism, a more common-sense application
of forum analysis will be needed.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in First Unitarian firmly rejects the intent test in favor of a test that asks instead, whether the speech is compatible
with the objective characteristics of the government property. Though the
Tenth Circuit retains the categorical framework established in Perry, the
framework is not allowed to obscure the fundamental First Amendment
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questions surrounding the property in question. The result is a useful discussion of the tension between government interests and free speech interests
that is almost absent from the plurality opinion in ISKCON.
The bulk of academic commentary has come to view forum analysis
as something akin to the embarrassing relative in the family of constitutional
law jurisprudence. Forum analysis has been roundly criticized for its artificial framework, its increasingly pro-government implementation, and the
way it has been used to shield the Supreme Court from the obligation to
conduct sincere First Amendment analysis."' However, it is undeniable that
forum analysis is currently the decided judicial tool for dealing with speech
activities on government property.3 ' The First Unitarian ruling has confirmed that reliance, and academic criticism is likely to continue as well. At
the very least, however, First Unitarian has provided us with an interpretation of forum analysis that involves a serious discussion of the First
Amendment. Since the City's appeal to the Supreme Court was denied certiorari, it remains to be seen whether or not our highest Court will follow
suit.

12

SETH D. ROGERS

310.
311 .

See supra note 30.
See supra note 29.

312.

In the meantime, the fight continues on in Salt Lake City. At the time of this note's

completion, a recent land swap between the City and the LDS Church, championed by Salt
Lake City Mayor Rocky Anderson, promised to end the entire controversy by selling the
easement back to the LDS Church in exchange for grounds to house a new community center.
Heather May, Plaza Plan; Mayor offers easement in swapfor west-side site; Private Groups
Would Fund Center, S.L. TaI., Dec. 17, 2002, at Al. The ACLU has already filed suit

against the City, claiming that Mayor Anderson caved-in to "the extraordinary pressure
brought by the LDS Church" abandoning his initial opposition to the plaza deal. Holly
Mullen, Longtime maverick pressesfightfor Main Street Plaza, S.L.

TRIB.,

Aug. 14, 2003, at

B1. The mayor agreed to the deal following an LDS Church public relations campaign targeted at Salt Lake City constituents. Heather May, Church Markets Its Side on Plaza; LDS
officials send info packets to business owners, city leaders; LDS Church Launches Plaza
Media Blitz, S.L. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2002, at Al. A ruling from United States District Judge

Dale Kimball is still pending. Heather May & Linda Fantin, Plaza guards bounce students,
S.L. TaB., Mar. 25, 2004, at C1; Brady Snyder, Judge to rule on plaza suit, DESERET NEWS,
Jan. 27, 2004.
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